The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) adopted by consensus on 4 September 2026 a three-layer characterisation of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), ending nearly a decade of definitional wrangling among the States Parties.

The chapeau of paragraph 25 of the GGE's 2024-2026 Report reads: a lethal autonomous weapon system "can be characterized as a combination of one or more weapons and technological components operating together, that is capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging a target in a way that results in loss of life, without intervention by a human being operating the system."

How did the GGE break the impasse?

Delegations split at least eight years ago over whether a definition was needed at all, and how broadly or narrowly to draw it. France and Germany pushed narrow formulations aimed at futuristic systems without human supervision. The United States and the ICRC favoured broader definitions covering existing systems. France's August 2021 proposal to distinguish "partially" from "fully" autonomous weapons did not resolve the dispute.

The political breakthrough came in 2021–2022 with the two-tier approach: prohibition of some LAWS (tier 1), regulation of others (tier 2), with the demarcation left open. That compromise "potentially reassured other States that a comprehensive ban on all LAWS was no longer on the agenda," Professor Rain Liivoja of the University of Queensland Law School writes in a 5 October analysis. "Thus, identifying a baseline characterisation for all LAWS lost much of its political sensitivity."

What are the three layers?

Layer one is the chapeau itself. Layer two consists of three clarifications in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), adopted by consensus after three annual sessions. Subparagraph (b) addresses anti-materiel concerns: "The fact that a LAWS can be used in a way that does not result in loss of life, such as to damage or destroy objects or to cause injury, does not exclude it from this characterization."

Layer three comprises four understandings the Chair delivered orally in a formal session on the afternoon of 4 September 2026. They were not formally voted on, but the absence of objection treated them as the common understanding of the GGE. By analogy with Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, they form part of the "context" for reading the report.

Which wording battles mattered most?

Three substantive fights dominated the negotiation.

First, the notion of "weapon system." NATO's terminology database includes personnel within a weapon system; the Australian guide to the legal review of new weapons excludes them. Russia draws a separate term, "weapon complex" (kompleks vooruzheniya), distinct from "weapon system" (sistema vooruzheniya). The agreed "combination of one or more weapons and technological components operating together" replaced "functionally integrated" only at the very end — an attempt to tighten the language that may have actually loosened it.

Second, the critical functions. Earlier US and ICRC language required only "select and engage." Singapore pressed for "identify" as well, and the cumulative reading won. To prevent that criterion from excluding systems that match pre-set target profiles, subparagraph (a) adds that a system remains a LAWS even where "a human being programs or otherwise determines a set of potential targets or characteristics thereof."

Third, lethality. Russia and China insisted on retaining the element. Other delegations argued the requirement would be anomalous under international humanitarian law (IHL), because general IHL rules do not turn on lethal or non-lethal effect, and would risk excluding anti-materiel weapons. The compromise wording, "capable of … engaging a target in a way that results in loss of life," was reportedly finalised in an informal session on the GGE's last day.

What does the ruling change for practitioners?

The characterisation now fixes the material scope of the future CCW LAWS instrument. Weapons meeting paragraph 25 sit within tier 2 (regulation); whether some cross into tier 1 (prohibition) is a separate question. Many of the risk-mitigation and bias-related measures in the report's elements apply outside the definition as well.

Liivoja flags a residual ambiguity. A loitering munition cued by a pre-set radar signature now falls inside the definition; a sensor-fused anti-tank munition launched at a specific column does not. The boundary turns on whether human personnel determine "a specific group of targets and the timing of the attack." Multiple delegations pushed to read this as "a group of specific targets" — closer to "specific military objective" in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I — but the proposal failed.

On lethality, the Chair's understanding that the definition is "framed in terms of [the] capability" of the system, rather than its design purpose, broadens it beyond the "primarily designed" or "specifically designed" tests used in CCW Protocols III and IV on incendiary and blinding laser weapons. A rubber-bullet sentry whose projectiles can occasionally kill therefore qualifies as a LAWS. Only narrow directed-energy weapons may now sit outside the definition.