State parties to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems (GGE LAWS) adopted a final set of elements by consensus in the early hours of 5 September, but only after replacing the phrase "it is prohibited" with "must not" in the paragraphs restating core international humanitarian law (IHL) prohibitions — a change Russia demanded and other states accepted during informal sessions on 3 and 4 September.

The shift, in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the final set of elements, sits at the centre of a new analysis by Sally Longworth, Senior Lecturer in Public International Law at Stockholm University and researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Longworth argues the change raises doubts about whether the text still reflects established, absolute IHL obligations — despite the negotiating states' repeated insistence that the Group was not "creating new law".

What do paragraphs 26-30 reaffirm?

The opening paragraphs of the relevant section track existing treaty and customary law closely:

• Paragraph 26 restates that the right of parties to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, echoing the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) preamble, Article 35(1) of Additional Protocol I (API) and Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (IV).
• Paragraph 30 reproduces the Martens clause almost verbatim from CCW preamble paragraph 4; two added commas appear to be drafting or grammatical corrections, not substantive changes.
• Paragraph 27 confirms IHL applies to armed conflict and governs weapons "of the past, those of the present, and those of the future, including those incorporating emerging technologies in the area of LAWS".
• Paragraph 29 states IHL applies fully to the development and use of LAWS, aligning with Article 36 API. The word "deployment" appeared in the July 2024 text but was dropped in November 2024; it resurfaces in paragraph 37.

Paragraph 28 proved the hardest to settle. It evolved from "Humans must at all times remain accountable in accordance with applicable international law for decisions on the use of force" (July 2024) to "States must ensure that humans at all times remain responsible and accountable..." (November 2024), before reaching its final form, first tabled in the May 2025 rolling text: "IHL imposes obligations on States, parties to armed conflict, and individuals, not on machines."

That formulation, adopted unchanged by consensus, reaffirms Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 1(1) API and customary IHL rules (ICRC Study Rules 139 and 144). It settles, to an extent, the persistent negotiation problem of capturing "the human element": responsibility for compliance with IHL firmly remains with humans.

Why does "must not" matter?

The prohibitions in paragraphs 31-33 codify what the International Court of Justice called cardinal principles of IHL "constituting the fabric of [IHL]" in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (para. 78): the prohibition on means of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, rooted in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration; the ban on inherently indiscriminate weapons (Article 51(4) API, ICRC Customary IHL Study Rules 70 and 71); and the prohibition on making civilians the object of attack.

The ICJ stressed in paragraph 79 that "these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law".

During the formal reading on 3 September, Russia objected that the GGE was not mandated to negotiate a treaty and that "prohibition" language was therefore inappropriate — a point it had raised as early as the March 2025 meetings. Mexico, the Philippines and Algeria had resisted earlier attempts to accommodate Russia's position. The June 2026 rolling text and the 3 September draft still used "it is prohibited", but agreement in informal sessions changed the wording.

The problem, Longworth writes, is one of fidelity to existing law: "it is prohibited" would have clearly conveyed the absolute nature of the obligations, while "must not" leaves unclear whether something different is meant and to whom the paragraphs are addressed — partially undoing the clarifying work of paragraph 28.

Which elements were dropped?

Two paragraphs that survived multiple rolling texts between July 2024 and September 2026 failed to reach the final report.

First, a non-proliferation-style provision: "States undertake not to manufacture, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or transfer LAWS that cannot be used in compliance with IHL." First added in May 2025, it was softened to "shall refrain from" in December 2025, accompanied by a training-and-countermeasures exception that was removed in March 2026. It disappeared from the 3 September draft. A reference to the risk of acquisition by terrorists was added to paragraph 37 during the final informal sessions on 4 September — but Longworth predicts several states will want to revisit the gap.

Second, a prohibition dropped at the last moment: "It is prohibited to use LAWS if their effects in attack cannot be anticipated and limited, as required by IHL in the circumstances of their use." Israel, the US and Russia objected on 3 September. Austria and Panama countered that the text reflected an established IHL prohibition, long agreed in the rolling texts — it mirrors Article 51(4)(c) API, ICRC Study Rule 12(c) and the ICJ's 1996 ruling. Notably, the US and Israel are parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW but not to API, which Longworth suggests partly explains their restrictive reading; Russia is party to both.

What does this mean for practitioners?

The adopted elements reaffirm that IHL applies fully to LAWS, that human responsibility is non-transferable to machines, and that the CCW framework — not a new treaty — remains the vehicle for norm development in this area. But the softened prohibitory language and the two dropped paragraphs leave grey zones: whether "must not" carries the same legal force as "it is prohibited", and how non-compliant systems will be prevented from reaching non-state actors. States including Austria, Panama, Mexico, the Philippines and Algeria are positioned to press for stronger restatements of existing IHL in the next stage of work. For lawyers advising governments and defence contractors, the consensus text remains interpretively significant: under the ILC's 2018 draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and practice, consensus understandings by treaty parties of the CCW's scope can inform treaty interpretation even without creating new law.