The United States has imposed new sanctions on the International Criminal Court, reviving and extending a punitive framework aimed at the Hague-based tribunal and the people who work for it.

The Guardian reported the development. The move marks the latest turn in a long-running confrontation between Washington and the ICC, which the US has consistently refused to join.

What do the new measures target?

The sanctions apply to the International Criminal Court itself and, under previous iterations of comparable measures, to court personnel — judges, prosecutors and staff — involved in investigations the US considers unlawful. The earlier sanctions regime, introduced by the Trump administration in 2020 and revoked in 2021, targeted then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and one of her senior aides after the court opened an inquiry into alleged war crimes by US forces in Afghanistan.

The renewed measures restore that approach. They empower US authorities to freeze assets and block entry of individuals deemed to have assisted ICC investigations against US nationals or nationals of allied states that are not parties to the Rome Statute.

Why does Washington object to the court?

The US position rests on a single core argument: the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. The United States signed the treaty in 2000 but never ratified it, and later formally withdrew its signature.

Successive US administrations, Republican and Democratic alike, have rejected any claim of ICC authority over American military and intelligence personnel. Congress embedded that stance in law through the American Service-Members' Protection Act of 2002, which authorizes measures to free US personnel from ICC custody — legislation critics nicknamed "The Hague Invasion Act."

Who faces the practical consequences?

For practitioners, the immediate effect falls on several groups:

• ICC officials directly involved in investigations touching US nationals or non-party allies, who risk asset freezes and US travel bans;
• Defense counsel, investigators and experts working with the court, particularly those with US banking relationships or travel exposure;
• Multinational companies and NGOs that cooperate with ICC investigations, which must now weigh sanctions exposure under US law;
• State parties to the Rome Statute, which face renewed pressure between their treaty obligations and bilateral relations with Washington.

What does the ruling change?

The sanctions do not shut the ICC down. The court, seated in The Hague and established by the 1998 Rome Statute, continues to operate with 124 states parties. But the measures constrain the tribunal's practical reach. They complicate recruitment, banking and evidence-gathering, and they signal to allied governments that cooperation with the court may carry a bilateral cost.

A pattern of pressure, not a first clash

This is not the first US move against the ICC. The 2020 sanctions followed the court's decision to open an Afghanistan investigation covering alleged crimes by US forces. The Biden administration lifted those sanctions in 2021 as a goodwill gesture toward multilateral institutions.

The renewed measures return US policy to a coercive footing. They also land at a moment when the ICC's docket includes matters with sharp political salience — including warrants targeting senior figures in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Middle East — which have divided international opinion and drawn threats of retaliation from several governments.

What happens next?

The ICC has consistently condemned sanctions against its officials as attacks on international justice. The Assembly of States Parties, the court's governing body, is expected to voice support for the institution and may coordinate practical assistance for affected personnel.

Legal challenges within the US and diplomatic pushback from Rome Statute states are likely. The core dispute, however, remains unchanged: the United States denies the court's authority over its nationals, while the ICC asserts that its jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of states parties — such as Afghanistan — stands independent of the accused's nationality.

For now, practitioners on both sides of the divide must map a sanctions perimeter that did not exist a year ago — and advise clients accordingly.