Law report No. GLW-6406 · filed November 17, 2026

LegislationReported case

One Notification Can Switch Off India's Data Protection Act

Section 17(2)(a) of India's DPDP Act, 2023 lets the Central Government exempt any state body from the entire Act by notification, with no reasons, records or review.

By Priya Raman5 min read1,014 words

Holding

  1. Section 17(2)(a) of the DPDP Act, 2023 exempts state instrumentalities from the entire Act with no recorded reasons or review.
  2. The DPDP Rules, 2025 impose no conditions on the exemption, unlike the 60-day, 180-day maximum interception orders under 2024 telecom rules.
  3. The December 2021 Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended a 'just, fair, reasonable and proportionate' procedure; none survived into the Act.
  4. In May 2026 the Ministry was still recruiting the Data Protection Board's Chairperson and four Members.
  5. PUCL v. Union of India (1997) forced safeguards onto Telegraph Act interception; the DPDP Act contains none.
One Notification Away: How DPDP Act Lets State Switch Itself Off
PlateOne Notification Away: How DPDP Act Lets State Switch Itself Off — photos_pixels / pixabay

India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 can be switched off for any state instrumentality through a single executive notification — with no recorded reasons, no time limit and no review. That is the practical effect of Section 17(2)(a), and the DPDP Rules, 2025 add nothing to constrain it.

What does Section 17(2)(a) actually allow?

The provision lets the Central Government exempt any "instrumentality of the state" from the entire Act. The listed grounds are the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, and preventing incitement to related offences. That is the only condition. The Government need not record its reasons. No body outside the executive reviews the decision.

Consider two students. Riya attends a private college; Aman attends a government-run college. Both institutions provide free Wi-Fi and log the websites students visit. Both suffer a leak on the same night. Riya's college must inform her and report the breach to the Data Protection Board, which can inquire into a complaint. If the Government has notified Aman's college under Section 17(2)(a), the Act no longer applies to it. Aman has no complaint route. Nobody must tell him anything. One notification is the entire difference.

Do the Rules fill the gap?

They do not. The DPDP Rules, 2025 say nothing about how such a notification is made, reviewed or ended. The Rules do impose conditions on the research exemption in Section 17(2)(b), which sits directly beside it. The state-security exemption received none. The omission looks deliberate; proving intent is another matter.

How does the telecom law treat the same grounds?

Parliament passed the Telecommunications Act the same year, and Section 20(2) uses almost identical grounds for interception. Phone tapping is among the most intrusive state powers. Yet that Act attaches conditions. Orders must be made "for reasons to be recorded in writing" and follow procedures in rules. The rules, notified in 2024, demand more still:

  • Each order must state reasons and name the executing agency, and the authority must consider whether the information is obtainable by other reasonable means.
  • An order lasts 60 days, is renewable, and cannot exceed 180 days; the agency must keep records of what was intercepted and who saw it.
  • A Review Committee meets every two months and can set an order aside and order destruction of intercepted messages.

The Software Freedom Law Centre noted during drafting that neither the Act nor the rules provide judicial oversight. Imperfect, yes. But a tap has an officer, a clock, a record and a reviewer. A Section 17(2)(a) notification has none of these.

The Ministry told the Joint Parliamentary Committee in 2020 that it followed precedent from the IT Act and the Indian Telegraph Act. In PUCL v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301, the Supreme Court had to read safeguards into the Telegraph Act's interception power. Parliament later wrote safeguards into telecom law. The data law dropped them.

What did earlier drafts contain?

The 2018 draft Bill accompanying the Srikrishna Committee Report allowed state-security processing only under a parliamentary law, following a set procedure, and only if necessary and proportionate. The 2019 Bill moved the power to the executive and, though critics called Clause 35 a blanket exemption, it still required written reasons, specification of exempted processing, and prescribed safeguards with oversight.

In December 2021, the Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended a procedure that is "just, fair, reasonable and proportionate". One member proposed pre-clearance by the Appellate Tribunal. None of it survived. The 2019 Bill was withdrawn in 2022; the replacement kept the grounds and dropped everything else. Dr. John Brittas, dissenting before the Standing Committee, questioned whether the clause met the proportionality test in Puttaswamy. In the Rajya Sabha in August 2023, Dr. Amar Patnaik said the proportionality aspect was missing and the restrictions should track Article 19(2). S. Niranjan Reddy, who supported the Bill, called the power "a little sweeping". The clause passed unchanged.

Who counts as the State?

Section 2(zb) defines State through Article 12 of the Constitution. Under Ajay Hasia and Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002), a body financially, functionally and administratively dominated by government qualifies. A government college, hospital or public sector bank could meet the test. Nothing in Section 17(2)(a) requires any link between the body and the ground cited. Aman's college and an intelligence agency land in the same legal category.

The Supreme Court has read these grounds narrowly before. In Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat (2020), it described security of the State as the narrowest of three circles — inside public order, inside law and order — and held ordinary economic hardship does not reach it. That reading is available to a court on challenge. Nothing requires the Government to clear that bar before notifying.

Is there any checking mechanism?

No. Once a body is notified, the Act stops applying, so the Data Protection Board loses all power over it. For everyone else, the Government appoints Board members for two-year terms, with reappointment possible. In May 2026, the Ministry was still inviting applications for the Chairperson and four Members of what its own circular calls an "independent adjudicatory authority" — eighteen months after the question arose, the independence remains asserted rather than tested.

The Rules also let the Government demand information from a company and bar the company from telling the affected person. Disclosure requires written permission of an "authorised person" — and for a notified body, that officer is chosen by its own head.

The Government's answer is judicial review. A court can strike down a bad notification. But someone must discover the notification, sue and win, and the person most affected may never learn of it. Telecom review runs every two months regardless of complaints. Here, review runs only if the victim somehow finds out.

The plain takeaway: India's data law gives the state a faster exit from privacy obligations than the law gives it to tap a phone.

via livelaw.in (Source)

Filed under

  • digital-personal-data-protection-act
  • section-17-2
  • state-exemptions
  • data-protection
  • privacy
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Priya Raman

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Staff writer covering companies, deals and strategy in International law and legal practice at Global Law Wire.

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