Law report No. GLW-1109 · filed November 20, 2026
Regulation & EnforcementReported case
INTERPOL Blocks Its Own Watchdogs From Reading Police Messages
INTERPOL's General Assembly voted in 2024 and 2025 to bar its Secretariat and the CCF from reading direct police messages unless senders consent, shielding its largest cooperation channel from oversight.
By Marcus Bennett5 min read1,024 words
Holding
- In November 2024 (Glasgow) and 2025 (Marrakech), INTERPOL's General Assembly amended the RPD Article 22(6) and CCF Statute Article 19 to restrict oversight access to direct NCB messages.
- Direct messages run to tens of millions per year, versus 27,525 notices and 30,015 diffusions in 2025.
- The NEXUS messaging platform, due for full rollout by end-2027, will make cross-checking against INTERPOL systems possible.
- On 31 December 2026, the Lyon judicial court is due to rule on INTERPOL's immunity in a Bahraini dissident's damages claim.
- The CCF retains 'free and unlimited access' to INTERPOL data under Article 19(1), but message access now requires permission or awareness of a potential violation.

In November 2024 and again in 2025, INTERPOL's General Assembly amended its rules to bar the organization's own oversight bodies from accessing the content of direct messages between national police bureaus, closing review of what is by far its largest cooperation channel — a system carrying messages in the tens of millions a year, against 27,525 notices and 30,015 diffusions in 2025.
Under the amendments, neither INTERPOL's General Secretariat nor the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF), its independent watchdog, may read those messages unless the sender grants explicit permission or the body becomes aware of a potential violation of the rules. Legal experts on INTERPOL argue the change could have serious implications for the organization's accountability and its legal immunity.
What did the General Assembly decide?
At its Glasgow session in November 2024, the General Assembly adopted the current text of Article 22(6) of the Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD). Where the General Secretariat "is not a recipient of, or has not accessed the exchange," its role is now primarily to keep the channel secure. It may examine compliance only when it "becomes aware of a potential violation," and otherwise cannot access content without "explicit authorization by the entity concerned." The provision applies despite the General Secretariat's duties under Articles 10 to 18 of the RPD, including access rights in Article 18, and Article 22(5), which governs spot checks.
A year later in Marrakech, the General Assembly amended Article 19 of the CCF Statute. Article 19(1) still grants the Commission "free and unlimited access to all data processed in the INTERPOL Information System." Article 19(2) now subjects the CCF's access to messages to the same two conditions: awareness of a potential violation, or permission.
The timing is striking. The reforms arrived as INTERPOL rolled out NEXUS, a new messaging platform planned for all members by the end of 2027, which uses structured fields and makes messages easier to search. INTERPOL itself says that "in the medium term, it will be possible to cross-check incoming information against INTERPOL's systems." The amendments turned what may have been a matter of practice into a binding rule at the very moment large-scale review was becoming technically feasible.
Why do the messages matter?
INTERPOL operates three cooperation channels. Notices are requested by a National Central Bureau (NCB) and published by the General Secretariat after a compliance check. Diffusions are sent by an NCB directly to other members and are usually reviewed. Direct messages, sent through the I-24/7 secure system launched in 2002, are the third channel — and are not recorded in INTERPOL's databases unless the General Secretariat is copied in or the sender consents (RPD Article 9(4)).
Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution makes it "strictly forbidden" for the organization to undertake any activity of a political character. The Notices and Diffusions Task Force reviews every Red Notice before publication, and the CCF can order deletion of a notice by a decision binding on the organization (CCF Statute, Articles 3(2)(c) and 38(1)). Both safeguards depend on INTERPOL being able to see the data.
What does the change mean in practice?
Consider a dissident abroad whose Red Notice was refused or deleted by the CCF because the case was political. Nothing now prevents the same government from asking its counterparts, by direct message the next day, to locate or arrest that person on the same facts. Unless the General Secretariat is copied in, neither it nor the CCF will see the message, and the dissident will ordinarily never know it exists.
INTERPOL's own guidance states that once a notice or diffusion is denied under Article 2(1) or 3 of the Constitution, "no further cooperation is allowed to take place via INTERPOL" — a prohibition that covers direct messages. But detection now depends largely on a report from one of the very bureaus whose conduct the review is meant to check. Someone who already won a favorable CCF decision would in practice need a copy of the message to prove a bureau is circumventing it — exactly what the rule keeps out of reach.
There is a case for confidentiality. Messages can concern ongoing investigations or informants, and members may resist an international secretariat reading bilateral exchanges. Yet notices and diffusions also carry sensitive operational data, and INTERPOL reviews them anyway. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights recommended in a 2015 issue paper that overseers' access not be subject to the intelligence "third party rule," so oversight is not "subject to an effective veto by foreign bodies," and Germany's Federal Constitutional Court held in 2020 that oversight of foreign intelligence must not be obstructed by that rule.
What fixes have been proposed?
Two narrow changes would address the risk while keeping confidentiality as the default. First, the NEXUS platform could check each message against INTERPOL's records before sending, warning an NCB that names a person whose notice was refused or deleted on Article 2 or 3 grounds — a record that could ground a "potential violation" finding under Article 22(6)(b) RPD. Second, the RPD could codify INTERPOL's existing practice: after deletions, countries are already told weekly "not to use INTERPOL's channels," but only in guidance, not in the rules.
The stakes extend to INTERPOL's immunity. In Marrakech the General Assembly adopted a General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities giving protection from "judicial and other forms of legal process" with three narrow exceptions, none covering abuse victims; Article 15(b) points data disputes to the CCF, which cannot award compensation. On 31 December 2026, the Lyon judicial court is due to rule on whether INTERPOL's immunity under its 2008 French headquarters agreement bars a damages claim by a Bahraini dissident arrested on a Red Notice and extradited. As scholars including Cheah, Reinisch and Kanetake have argued, the CCF's value as a remedy depends on its ability to examine the data at issue — and for INTERPOL's largest channel, that ability now depends on sender consent.
via interpol.int (Original)
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