Law report No. GLW-8994 · filed September 29, 2026

Antitrust & CompetitionReported case

EU Court: No-Poach Deals in Football Can Restrict Competition

The ECJ's CD Tondela judgment treats football no-poach deals as competition restrictions while opening a roster-stability defence that may apply beyond the pandemic context.

By Marcus Bennett4 min read837 words

Holding

  1. On April 30, 2026, the European Court of Justice ruled in Case C 133/24, CD Tondela and Others, on a COVID-era no-poach agreement between Portuguese football clubs.
  2. The Court held the agreement 'constitutes a manifest restriction of a competitive parameter which plays an essential role in high-level sport' (para. 53).
  3. The Court recognised roster stability as a potentially legitimate justification, building on Cases C-333/21 and C-650/22, and left proportionality assessment to the referring Portuguese court.
A New EU Ruling on No-Poach Agreements in Sports Leaves Room for Roster Stability Considerations - Skadden, Arps, Slate,
PlateA New EU Ruling on No-Poach Agreements in Sports Leaves Room for Roster Stability Considerations - Skadden, Arps, Slate, — AI-generated

The European Court of Justice ruled on April 30, 2026, in Case C 133/24, CD Tondela and Others, that a no-poach agreement between Portuguese professional football clubs restricting player recruitment during the COVID-19 pandemic can constitute a restriction of competition under EU law — while simultaneously recognising, for the first time in such clear terms, that roster stability may serve as a legitimate justification in the sports context.

The case concerned first and second division clubs of the Portuguese Professional Football Association (Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional, LPFP). When the pandemic forced suspension of the football season in Portugal, the clubs agreed not to recruit players who terminated their employment contracts because of COVID-19. The question before the Court was whether this agreement constituted a restriction of competition "by object" under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The Court's Analysis

The Court first confirmed its settled case law that only a narrow set of practices adopted by sports clubs and associations falls outside the scope of EU competition law. Rules on noneconomic aspects of sport — such as how the game is played — remain outside competition law (paras. 30-31). Rules on the professional mobility of players, by contrast, have a direct impact on the conditions for engaging in economic activity and fall squarely within it (paras. 33-34).

No-poach agreements will generally qualify as automatic, "by object" infringements, without any need to examine actual economic effects (paras. 40 and 42). The Court cautioned, however, that this categorisation requires assessment of the agreement's content, its economic and legal context, and its objectives (para. 43). Market reality matters more than form, even where anticompetitive effects need not be shown; less clear-cut cases demand a detailed contextual examination (paras. 47-48).

Applying that framework, the Court held that the no-poach agreement, even if limited to the COVID-19 period, "constitutes a manifest restriction of a competitive parameter which plays an essential role in high-level sport" (para. 53).

Yet the judgment's significance lies in what followed. The Court reasoned that clubs' ability to compete economically, including through player recruitment, depends on their ability to participate in a sporting competition (para. 59). Such competitions, it stated, "depend on maintaining a balance and on preserving a certain equality of opportunity as between the participating professional football clubs, given the interdependence that binds them together" (para. 60).

On that basis, the Court found that "it may be legitimate for a sporting association to seek to ensure, to a certain extent, the stability of the composition of the player rosters […] during a given season — for example by proscribing the unilateral termination of employment contracts during the season — or during a given year" (para. 64). Prohibiting unilateral terminations during the season, except for just cause, pursues the pro-competitive objective of roster stability (paras. 85-86). Without such measures, players who unilaterally terminate their contracts could be freely hired midseason, which "would have inevitably and significantly altered the composition of the various teams involved, thereby undermining the integrity of competition" (para. 73).

The Court left it to the referring Portuguese court to determine whether the pro-competitive objective of roster stability means the no-poach requirement can no longer be considered sufficiently harmful to justify "by object" treatment (paras. 88-89).

The judgment also draws a distinction based on who adopts the restriction. Measures adopted by a sports association are more likely to be permissible than restrictions adopted directly by clubs (para. 70), though the Court accepted a scenario where clubs adopted the restriction with the association's endorsement (para. 72). The urgency of the pandemic may have influenced that approach (para. 76).

On justification, the Court confirmed that "by object" restrictions can be justified only on economic grounds under Article 101(3) TFEU. Restrictions not sufficiently harmful for "by object" treatment may additionally be justified by noneconomic grounds — legitimate objectives of general interest. Ensuring the proper conduct of sporting competitions, including transfer-window rules and measures maintaining a degree of roster stability, qualifies as such an objective (para. 96). The referring court must still assess the agreement's suitability, necessity and proportionality (paras. 98-99).

Consequences for Practitioners

The ruling is the clearest endorsement yet of a possible "stability" justification for restrictions between sporting clubs in the Court's case law. Although COVID-19 forms the backdrop, the reasoning suggests the justification may apply more widely — with potential implications for other contested issues such as salary caps, contractual terms and player transfer fees. For clubs and associations, the practical message is twofold: calibrate any recruitment-restricting measures so they remain proportionate to a legitimate stability objective, and route them through the sports association rather than adopting them directly, since club-level no-poach measures without association support will face particularly close scrutiny. The judgment builds on prior rulings including Case C-333/21, European Superleague Company v FIFA and UEFA, and Case C-650/22, FIFA v BZ.

via bma-abc.be (Original)

Filed under

  • eu-competition-law
  • article-101-tfeu
  • no-poach-agreements
  • sports-law
  • cjeu
Share this article:

More from Marcus Bennett

Marcus Bennett

Show full bio

Market editor covering marketplaces and e-commerce at Global Law Wire.

192 articles

Also before the court

« Previous articleNext article »