Law report No. GLW-7373 · filed November 20, 2026
LegislationReported case
China's Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law Took Effect Nov. 6
China's ACBC took effect Nov. 6, making weak compliance a violation in itself and barring evidence transfers to foreign regulators without Chinese approval. Here's what counsel advise.
By Sophie Lindqvist5 min read999 words
Holding
- China's Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law was adopted and took effect Nov. 6.
- An inadequate compliance program is itself a violation, punishable by suspension or permit revocation without proof of bribery.
- Article 25 bars providing evidence to foreign anti-corruption probes without prior Chinese approval.
- The law reaches private-sector bribery abroad, the demand side of bribery, and has no facilitating-payments exception.
- Implementing guidance is pending; GB/T 35770-2022 (effective Oct. 12, 2022) offers an auditable adequacy benchmark.

China's Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (ACBC) took effect on Nov. 6, the same day it was adopted, and it applies directly to the China branches and subsidiaries of foreign companies. The law requires companies engaged in cross-border business to maintain an anti-corruption compliance program. Falling short is a violation in itself, even if no bribe is ever proven.
Jieni Ji, a regulatory enforcement and investigations partner in Reed Smith's Hong Kong office, laid out the stakes in a written Q&A. Her core message: "Your China program must be able to stand on its own. A local translation of the global policy is no longer enough."
What does the law require?
The ACBC imposes six compliance mandates:
- governance and resources;
- investigations;
- risk assessment and internal reporting;
- books and records;
- third-party management; and
- training.
If a company's program falls short, authorities can order rectification. If the company does not comply, they can suspend operations or revoke business permits — with no proof of bribery required. Violations can also go on credit records that affect licensing and market access.
Until now, many multinationals built China compliance to earn cooperation credit with the SEC and DOJ. Under the ACBC, the same elements are legal obligations of the China entity itself.
How does it differ from the FCPA?
Ji said companies with robust FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) controls have "less homework, but not none." The ACBC's core elements broadly track the DOJ's "Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs." But the Chinese law goes further in four ways:
- the books-and-records duty applies to every covered company, not just issuers;
- it is read to cover private-sector bribery abroad, which the FCPA does not;
- it reaches the demand side of bribery — the acceptance of bribes; and
- it has no facilitating-payments exception and no affirmative defenses.
The difference that matters most: purely commercial bribery involving Chinese counterparties may fall outside the FCPA yet sit squarely within the ACBC. The law covers five categories of cross-border corruption, from outbound and inbound bribery to suspects fleeing abroad and corrupt assets moved offshore. It asserts jurisdiction based on nationality, territory and effects.
One set of facts can now trigger both regimes — and they may pull in opposite directions on disclosure and evidence.
What does Article 25 block?
The sharpest conflict is over evidence. Article 25 bars any person or entity in China from providing evidence, data or assistance to foreign anti-corruption probes, or allowing foreign entities to investigate in China, without prior approval from the competent Chinese authorities.
That cuts directly against the DOJ's emphasis on voluntary self-disclosure and full cooperation. "This is where the two systems collide most directly," Ji said.
Under the DOJ's corporate enforcement policy, a company that voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates and timely remediates can, absent aggravating circumstances, expect a declination. Full cooperation typically means producing documents — and much of that evidence may sit in China. Before 2018, multinationals routinely self-disclosed China-related misconduct under the FCPA. That is harder now.
The restriction builds on existing blocking-type provisions: Article 4 of the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law (2018), Article 36 of the Data Security Law (2021) and Article 41 of the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). Ji's reading, though untested, is that bona fide internal investigations fall outside the restriction, since the ACBC itself requires companies to investigate. The sensitive step is transferring evidence out of China for foreign enforcement purposes. Pressure runs both ways: the ACBC also penalizes refusals to provide evidence to Chinese authorities.
What should practitioners do first?
Ji offered concrete steps. On program design: map which group entities are in scope, give each one clear local ownership of compliance, and test the China program against all six mandates, with paperwork held at the China-entity level.
Until implementing guidance arrives, the six statutory mandates are the best yardstick for "adequacy," and resources should be proportionate to company size, business scope and risk profile. Companies can also draw on GB/T 35770-2022, China's recommended national standard for compliance management systems, effective Oct. 12, 2022. Document the process in case the regulator knocks.
In the first days after a foreign regulator requests documents or interviews, Ji recommends four steps:
- assess whether the inquiry is substantively enforcement-related, and keep the internal investigation and the enforcement response on separate workstreams;
- conduct document review in-country and keep underlying data in China pending approvals;
- work with China counsel to explain the approval process to the US authority and set realistic timing expectations; and
- bring senior management, the board and communications into a coordinated response plan.
What about third parties and gifts?
The third-party gap is what happens after onboarding. The ACBC requires ongoing monitoring of third-party conduct and binding third parties to the company's integrity code. In practice: verify beneficial ownership, confirm contracted services were performed, tighten contract protections. The law expressly prohibits using intermediaries to pay bribes and creates an early-warning mechanism — anti-money laundering, audit and tax authorities must refer suspicious leads to anti-corruption authorities.
On gifts and hospitality, the ACBC creates no new offenses. Domestic commercial bribery remains governed by the Criminal Law and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. But weak controls now cost more: a loosely documented gifts practice can call the whole program's adequacy into question.
Is this just politics?
The law has a defensive side, authorizing countermeasures against foreign states that use anti-corruption enforcement as a pretext. But Ji warned that "dismissing the ACBC as a political statement would be a mistake." The law puts the Operation Sky Net campaign on a statutory footing, targets outbound and inbound bribery, anchors China's approach in the UN convention against corruption, and builds a coordinated enforcement network led by the National Supervisory Commission. Whether it reduces corruption depends on implementation. Either way, compliance teams should meet the ACBC on its own terms.
via corporatecomplianceinsights.com (Source)
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News editor covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in International law and legal practice at Global Law Wire.
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