Law report No. GLW-3930 · filed November 18, 2026

LegislationReported case

Belgium and Chile Merge Bids for BBNJ Secretariat in Two-City Pitch

Belgium and Chile merged their BBNJ Secretariat bids on 6 November 2026, proposing a two-city secretariat pitted against China's Xiamen at COP1's 18 January vote.

By Sophie Lindqvist4 min read833 words

Holding

  1. Belgium and Chile announced a merged BBNJ Secretariat bid on 6 November 2026, with the seat in Valparaíso and the Clearing-House Mechanism in Brussels.
  2. COP1 takes up modalities on 13 January and decides the seat on 18 January, with a two-thirds majority required after consensus efforts fail.
  3. The BBNJ Agreement counts 105 Parties and 145 signatories.
  4. China nominated Xiamen in January 2026, just as the Agreement entered into force.
  5. The Asia-Pacific is home to roughly 60 percent of the world's population but holds no seat under the joint bid.
One Secretariat, Two Continents? On the Chile-Belgium Merged Bid for the BBNJ Secretariat
PlateOne Secretariat, Two Continents? On the Chile-Belgium Merged Bid for the BBNJ Secretariat — PublicCo / pixabay

By Sophie Lindqvist

On 6 November 2026, nine weeks before COP1 convenes in New York, Belgium and Chile announced they will merge their candidatures for the BBNJ Secretariat (the body administering the UN treaty on marine biodiversity in waters beyond national jurisdiction). Under the joint offer, the Secretariat's seat would sit in Valparaíso, Chile, while the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM, the treaty's data and information hub) would run from Brussels. Brussels would also host meetings of the Agreement's subsidiary bodies.

The two foreign ministries framed the move "also as a contribution to facilitate an effective decision at COP1". A three-way race between Valparaíso, Brussels and Xiamen has now become a choice between two institutional models: a transcontinental, two-city secretariat, and China's single-city alternative.

What does the treaty actually allow?

Article 50 of the BBNJ Agreement speaks of a "seat" and a "host State", and contemplates a single headquarters agreement under Article 50(3). Nothing forbids distributed arrangements. But the drafting premise is plainly one institution in one place. The UN Secretary-General's note on administrative support assumes the same. It requires separate privileges-and-immunities arrangements for meetings held outside the host State.

Distributed secretariats have precedents. The Rotterdam Convention's COP1 accepted a joint Italian-Swiss offer for Geneva and Rome — though Article 19 of that treaty already assigned the secretariat function to UNEP and FAO jointly. The Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund sits in Montreal, apart from the Ozone Secretariat in Nairobi. The UNCCD hosted its Global Mechanism in Rome for fifteen years before consolidating it in Bonn, citing duplicated costs, coordination issues and unclear accountability chains.

The joint bid avoids some of those problems, since a single Secretariat would manage the CHM. It leaves others open. If the CHM suffers an outage, a breach or a policy dispute, who answers — the host of the seat or the host of the system? Concerns raised about data governance under a Xiamen-hosted Secretariat would now attach to an EU member state hosting the CHM infrastructure, while the Secretariat accountable for managing it sits in Chile.

Who backs which bid?

The merger looks like reciprocal arithmetic. Belgium gains a developing-country constituency, which the G77 and China prefer. Chile gains capacity, infrastructure — Ostend hosts global ocean-data systems such as the IODE and OBIS secretariats and the World Register of Marine Species — and a large diplomatic ecosystem. Chile's offer would bring the first universal-membership UN body to Latin America. China frames Xiamen in the same register: the first UN organization headquartered in the Asia-Pacific.

The support map is sparse. France backed Valparaíso in November 2024, Uruguay publicly in July 2026, and Mexico reportedly too. Chile's foreign minister claims further unnamed supporters. The Core Latin American Group, fourteen states including Chile and Brazil, has more neutrally called for a consensus decision. Belgium's Benelux partners recalled its candidacy at the International Seabed Authority in July 2025, but no formal EU endorsement exists. Pakistan, Vanuatu, Dominica and Togo have voiced support for Xiamen.

Brazil, a member of both CLAM and BRICS, illustrates the squeeze on states with close China ties. Abstention matters here, because only votes cast count towards the required two-thirds majority. Ballots are also secret, which weakens bloc loyalty. And neither component of the joint bid gives the Asia-Pacific, home to some 60 percent of the world's population, a foothold.

How will COP1 decide?

Article 50(1) instructs the COP to decide the seat at its first meeting. Until then, DOALOS (the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) acts as interim Secretariat under Article 50(2). The Preparatory Commission's procedure calls for consensus first, then a secret ballot with a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting, eliminating the lowest-placed candidate after each round. COP1 takes up modalities on 13 January and decides the seat on 18 January.

China, or any Party, could object that a joint offer is not an offer on "the seat", that the merger came too late, that Brussels commitments must be voted separately, or that the modalities decision itself requires consensus. Most such objections would be points of order, and the President's ruling would stand unless overturned by a simple majority.

The bigger risk is deadlock. Neither offer reaching two-thirds leaves DOALOS as interim Secretariat indefinitely under Article 50(2), burdening a UN budget already strained by a liquidity crisis. Parties could also pick Valparaíso as the seat yet decline or shrink the Brussels package, as the UNCCD did when it kept a liaison office in Rome after consolidating in Bonn.

The declared aim is an effective decision at COP1. But a division of labor that places the regime's money in Valparaíso and its data in Brussels raises its own questions — about cost, time zones, and whether the Secretariat's center of gravity would drift north, leaving Valparaíso a largely ceremonial seat.

via treaties.un.org (Original)

Filed under

  • bbnj-agreement
  • marine-biodiversity
  • cop1
  • belgium
  • chile
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News editor covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in International law and legal practice at Global Law Wire.

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