Law report No. GLW-8334 · filed November 10, 2026

Regulation & EnforcementReported case

Bank of America's $1.2 Billion Penalty: The Price of Overruling Compliance

FinCEN's $1.2 billion Bank of America penalty exposes the true cost of overruled compliance, as DOJ shifts enforcement to healthcare, tax and trade fraud.

By Amara Osei4 min read805 words

Holding

  1. FinCEN assessed a $1.2 billion civil penalty against Bank of America on Oct. 13 for willful Bank Secrecy Act violations, with the OCC adding $750 million and OFAC $11.6 million.
  2. The bank's remediation requires roughly 750 additional staff and 800 consultants; a lookback surfaced nearly 8,900 unfiled suspicious activity reports.
  3. Compliance recommended closing a risky customer worth about $6 million annually in July 2022; the business overrode it and the customer stayed until June 2025.
  4. DOJ's new National Fraud Enforcement Division issued an Oct. 1 directive prioritizing healthcare, procurement, tax and trade fraud.
  5. Freight forwarder Pegasus Worldwide Logistics paid OFAC $175,015 over a $5,950 machine due to inadequate screening.
Stop Calling Compliance a Cost Center
PlateStop Calling Compliance a Cost Center — nosheep / pixabay

FinCEN hit Bank of America with a $1.2 billion civil penalty on Oct. 13, in a consent order in which the bank admitted to willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act. The OCC added $750 million, credited against FinCEN's figure, and OFAC settled apparent sanctions violations for $11.6 million. The violations ran from 2018 into 2025, covering Iran, Russia, narcotics trafficking and terrorism sanctions programs, and failures to file suspicious activity reports tied to Chinese money laundering networks and illicit finance along the southwest border. The coordinated actions by three regulators carry one lesson: a compliance function that can see risk but cannot act on it is decoration.

What went wrong inside the bank?

By FinCEN's account, the compliance function did much of its job. In July 2022, compliance personnel identified an online auto auction customer whose risk was excessive and uncontrolled, and recommended closing the accounts. Investigators had documented well over a hundred cases tied to that single customer. Internal testing repeatedly showed the bank's primary monitoring system was missing suspicious activity.

The relationship team disagreed. It cited roughly $6 million in annual revenue and argued closure would be detrimental. A mitigation plan replaced the closure, and the customer kept processing payments until June 2025. When a monitoring system test produced a result senior leadership disliked, the head of financial crimes ordered the test repeated. The second run declared the system "working as intended." FinCEN disagreed. The regulators did not penalize the absence of policies; they penalized the gap between what the bank knew and what it did.

What did the arithmetic cost?

FinCEN concluded the bank had likely saved hundreds of millions of dollars in compliance spending while the problems persisted. The remediation now requires roughly 750 additional staff plus 800 consultants for a one-time lookback. That lookback alone surfaced nearly 8,900 suspicious activity reports that should have been filed. The bank has taken a $1.2 billion charge for penalties, a figure excluding the lookback, independent reviews, ongoing regulatory orders, management time and reputational damage. As compliance commentator Michael Volkov put it, the savings were not savings: "It was borrowing, at a punishing rate of interest, from the future."

The same logic operates at the other end of the scale. Pegasus Worldwide Logistics, a 12-person freight forwarder, paid OFAC $175,015 over a $5,950 machine because its screening was late and matched only a name. Better screening would have cost a fraction of the penalty.

Is the FCPA pause a permission slip?

Many boards have read the administration's FCPA pullback as proof that enforcement risk has eased and compliance spending can ease with it. Volkov, a compliance expert and attorney, calls that a dangerous misread: the Justice Department has reallocated its enforcement energy, not retreated, toward areas touching far more companies than the FCPA ever did.

The June 2025 guidance from then-Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche narrowed foreign bribery cases to matters such as cartel-linked payments and national security threats. In April, the Justice Department stood up the National Fraud Enforcement Division, and on Oct. 1 that division issued a directive naming four corporate priorities: healthcare fraud, government procurement and contracts fraud, tax and revenue evasion, and trade fraud including tariff evasion and forced labor. The False Claims Act has become a primary vehicle for customs cases. OFAC, BIS and DOJ continue to bring sanctions and export control actions.

The government's detection tools are also improving. The NFED directive points to data analytics through a national fraud detection center and instructs prosecutors to build whistleblower incentives reaching even insiders who participated in the conduct. A company cutting compliance reduces its ability to detect problems precisely as the government's ability increases.

What should practitioners do?

Volkov offers compliance officers under budget pressure four arguments, framed in leadership's language:

  • Quantify exposure, not activity. Replace training completion rates with the cost of a customs misclassification, a sanctions miss or a monitoring gap at the company's scale.
  • Use the peer record. The Bank of America order is a documented case study of what saving on compliance costs.
  • Show the efficiency story. Modernizing and prioritizing by risk beats across-the-board cuts, provided the approach is validated.
  • Establish red lines. Identify the functions that cannot be cut without exceeding risk tolerance, and ask leadership to accept that risk in writing.

Boards, he suggests, should ask a blunt question: in the past two years, how many times has compliance recommended against something, and what happened? An answer of "never" is not reassurance. It is a warning that compliance is not being asked or not being heard.

Bank of America's own people told it what was wrong in writing for years. Rebuilding a program after failure is always more expensive than maintaining one.

via corporatecomplianceinsights.com (Source)

Filed under

  • bank-of-america
  • fincen
  • bank-secrecy-act
  • ofac-sanctions
  • compliance-enforcement
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Amara Osei

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Senior reporter covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in International law and legal practice at Global Law Wire.

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